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In recent decades, the history of reading has given us an impressive catalogue of textual encounters. We have seen (to name some examples) how Gabriel Harvey read his Livy, how Thomas Cranmer read his Fisher, how Charles Babington Macaulay read his Pope, how Nicholas Udall read his Linacre; how John Dee read his Strabo, and how Guillaume Budé read his Homer, how Isaac Casaubon read his Hebrew texts, and how Rupert Brooke read his text books. These studies have something in common, in that they are all discussions of how a significant historical figure responded to a significant historical text. Studies of this kind are individually fascinating and tell us something really important about the readers whom they discuss. But what do they tell us about the history of reading more broadly? What can we learn from responses which are, almost by definition, extra-ordinary, and which are (in some cases) self-consciously virtuosic? And to what extent are these studies of exceptional reading dependent on a background understanding of ordinary reading? These questions are not new: they have pursued the study of readers’ annotations since its inception—ever since it purported be more than the learned appreciation of the ‘association copies’ so much beloved of nineteenth-century antiquaries and bibliophiles.

Questions of this kind should, I think, be embraced. They are the expressions not of scepticism, but of something more fundamental in the nature of historical scholarship. We have, it seems, the knowledge that something happened (at least once, somewhere, by someone, at a certain point in history) and then knowledge about the distribution of that phenomenon (socially, geographically and historically). These may be different kinds of historical knowledge, but in learning that something happened, we usually acquire an appetite for learning about its frequency and distribution. And if we don’t, then others will. The situation regarding readers’ annotations is slightly more specific: there is the exceptional evidence which tends to take centre-stage in people’s published research, and there is the more ordinary behaviour which scholars (not unreasonably) tend to summarise quickly or else pass over in silence. These categorises of ordinary and exceptional are not, of course, given to us ready-made. They arise from the exercise of conducting the research, but might still involve notions of exceptionality drawn from other areas of our experience. They are mutually defining, and there is always the risk of overstating what is exceptional, and this leads to gimmicks and sensationalism. Scholars have already begun think about the nature of ordinary and exceptional evidence. Bill Sherman has discussed the capacity of exceptional evidence to revitalise tired paradigms, and has cited Carlo Ginzburg’s observation that ‘a truly exceptional […] document can be much more revealing than a thousand stereotypical documents’.​[1]​ This is a fair point. But the situation which we have with readers’ annotations is actually the other way round: we are much better acquainted with the exceptions than with the background of more ordinary behaviour from which their significance is partly derived. This isn’t to suggest that we don’t know what ordinary evidence looks like—there is, after all, loads of it—but we are only just starting to try doing anything with it.

These are issues which historians of reading will increasingly be required to address, but there is, as yet, no consensus as to how they should do so. It might be contended, for example, that little methodological change is actually required. Committed book historians are already accustomed to consulting books frequently and in fairly large numbers; and inevitably they develop fairly detailed impressions of how often certain things do and don’t happen. These carefully attuned sensibilities are enormously important to the field as a whole—but learned experience is unlikely to provide the answer all by itself. One problem concerns communication. There is a difference between the highly developed sensibilities which I am describing and published research, which is capable of satisfying the curiosity of enthusiasts and of allaying the criticisms of sceptics. Another problem concerns verification. It is entirely plausible that two experienced historians will disagree over a question of generalities. When this happens, it may not be apparent (even to a third party) whether the disagreement has arisen more from differences in the material which they have examined, the way in which they examined it, or something else entirely.

These problems suggest that something more systematic is required—most obviously some kind of bibliographical survey. This is something which historians of reading have been doing for some time, so it will be useful to remind ourselves of the main techniques which they have used.

One option is to survey the books which a particular reader owned. This can be fairly straight-forward, especially if those books have all wound up in the same place. A survey of this kind will certainly tell us what was ordinary and what was exceptional for that reader—potentially quite a useful thing to know, depending on the identity of the reader—but it will contribute comparatively little to broader questions of frequency and distribution. Another type of survey examines multiple copies of a particular work. Here, many of the same advantages and disadvantages obtain, in that we gain some impression of the physical responses which a particular work tended to provoke (and not to provoke), yet are ultimately no better equipped for making broader historical generalisations. This approach is also more vulnerable to questions concerning survival rates—though here I should stress that (providing one has enough copies to perform a survey) one should largely be concerned with whether patterns of survival and destruction are likely to have distorted the evidence in a particular way. A significant variation on this technique, which David Pearson has described, is to survey different versions of a particular text: comparing, for example, folios with quartos, first editions with collected works, original language with translation, or full-text with abridgement.

Alternatively, if the prospect of long hours spent on public transport and long nights spent sleeping on floors and sofas doesn’t appeal, then one might instead perform a survey of books from within the comfort of a single, well-endowed library. This strategy makes it absolutely essential that one takes an interest the collection-history of that library, and that one realises that shelfmarks (even seemingly incidental combinations of letters and numbers) are often the expressions of important facts about the provenance of books. That large collections (especially those appended to academic institutions) are made up of many smaller collections can turn out to be a strength, since it enables multiple collections to be examined (and compared) from a single geographical location.

One final approach combines all of these previous methods, by examining multiple copies of multiple works across multiple collections. The purpose of attempting something on this scale would be to produce data which could, by itself, provide a foundation for making informed generalisations. One might, for example, survey seventeenth-century French literature in English libraries, or works associated with the Great Controversy of 1560s and 70s, which raged between English clergymen and Catholic exiles. The collection-histories of the libraries which were included would still be important, but the increased number of locations would help to spread the risk: though the individual collections would all have their own unique histories, the diversity of the sample would mean that the evidence which one accumulated could not, taken en masse, be subordinated to any single, localised pattern of causation. 

This method leaves open the question of how one selects material for consultation. If pretty much anything within some broadly defined historical and thematic criteria is considered fair-game, then how does one decide what goes in and what doesn’t? Part of the solution might come down to simple opportunism: if geographical diversity is desirable and if the accessibility of books varies between locations, then there are surely grounds for gorging oneself in some locations and for stinting oneself in others. But whilst this might satisfy the pragmatist (and offend the purist), it still leaves the question of how the survey ought to be weighted. Unless one is capable of selecting books in a manner which is truly random then one ought, surely, to produce a microcosm of the larger field in which one is interested—which potentially means spending ages totting up titles and editions long before any library visits can actually be made.

Work on this scale has the potential simply to be too much work. History has bequeathed us no small number of bibliophilies whose work seems to have pushed them towards insanity—amongst whom John Leyland is an obvious example—and whose examples we ought not to follow. The answer then is that we should collaborate. At the level of ideas-sharing, this is too elementary to merit an explanation, but it becomes more interesting when multiple scholars are involved in the exercise of data-collection. We ought, first of all, to think about data which has already been collected: what can you do with data that I have collected and what can I do with data that you have collected? Does it matter that we are different people? Any enumerative approach to readers’ annotations will involve classifying marks under certain headings—and these headings may be too vague and the process of classification too complicated for multiple scholars to abide by the same principles. Two scholars might agree each to examine half the books in a collection and to note every annotation which was aggressive, but then find that they had significantly dissimilar ideas about what this actually meant. Are problems of this kind insuperable? To believe that they are would, I think, be unduly sceptical, but it raises philosophical questions which are not altogether inconsequential—as I shall shortly explain. 

Another question is whether existing bodies of data can be amalgamated. On the whole, my impression is that the collection of data by scholars has been too varied for this to work, although we can, of course, compare general conclusions. To this extent, the data they have collected is no more or less useful than any other type of scholarship—and the fact that different data-sets are methodologically non-identical might additionally be useful for diagnosing faults in the way in which my own data has been collected. All this suggests a manner in which we might profitably emulate the physical sciences, in which surveys of previous studies are frequently the prelude to further empirical investigation. Based on this assessment, it seems that recent scholarship has already produced substantial resources for anyone confident enough to make generalisations.

All this is well and good, but there is a broader problem to consider, namely that there is an overlap between the collection and the interpretation of the data. What we are able to record depends on what we think we are looking at, and what we think we are looking at depends on what we think a particular symbol, mark or marginal note means. We might think that we could give a purely formal or physical description of annotations and classify them accordingly. This would involve the application of various categories which would inevitably have fuzzy edges, but it would enable a high level of systematicity and the amalgamation of evidence collected by different researchers. But when we record the annotations of historical readers, our situation is very different from that of physical scientists, recording, for example, the recession of glacial ice or the life-chances of genetically peculiar rodents. We are dealing with the historical actions of living people who behaved as they did for particular reasons. We must also remember that we want to do much more than describe and classify annotations; we want to be able to make inferences about how and why those annotations were made, the society in which they took place, and the contemporary meanings which they possessed. This means that a schema based entirely on formal or physical description is liable to miss the point.

Let us take the example of deletions in books. A reader might delete something (such as a duplicated word) because it is erroneous, but the same reader might delete something else (an obscenity, an idolatrous image, or an object of hatred) because it is morally objectionable. The lines of ink which perform these deletions might look exactly the same, and the actions which brought them about might have been very similar, but there is a difference at the level of intentionality and purpose. (Alternatively, it might simply be an ink-stain, in which case there is no intention at all.) Working out why a particular deletion was performed needn’t be that difficult, so long as we aim for a fairly general explanation. For instance, one might start by thinking about the potential controversy-value of the material and by looking for typographical errors. The point, however, is that the scholar recording the information would need to make these kinds of decision about the evidence or else record the information in sufficient (and potentially mind-numbing) detail for someone else to make those decisions on their behalf.

The same considerations apply to verbal annotations. A factual statement in the margin might have been intended to support or to confute the adjacent text, or something else entirely, and it might be difficult to determine which without studying their relationship in some detail. The level of connection between the content of the annotation and the main text, for instance, may allow us to make a judgements about whether the annotation was really a response to the text at all, or whether the annotator was simply using the volume as note-paper. A purely physical classification of annotations will leave out this information and will make it impossible for us to make inferences about what annotators were trying to achieve. Yet these are exactly the kinds of inference which we must make in order to learn anything worthwhile about the past.

The emphasis which I have placed on intentionally needs a little more explanation before I draw things to a close. We are not necessarily trying to recover the mental events of long-dead readers; instead we are formulating knowledge about the historical meanings of physical gestures. This is something which has been discussed by Quentin Skinner, who gives us the example (adapted from Peter Strawson) of a man skating on a frozen pond and a policeman who says ‘the ice is very thin’. This statement can either be a warning or a statement of fact—and one can only determine which by understanding the context in which it has been uttered. It is broadly the same with readers’ marks in books. We are not trying to recover the substance of past mental events, but are trying to make inferences about how and why historical readers thought and acted. This emphasis on the intentions which lie behind physically durable actions offers us a sensible middle-ground—something between phenomenology and behaviourism. There is merit, in other words, in using mentalistic and intentionalist vocabulary, but without allowing ourselves to suppose that the terms involved get their meaning through reference to private mental states. This approach has the benefit of enabling one to study and to classify evidence that is physical in nature, but without the danger of becoming fixated with its physical characteristics. It also provides a useful bridge between ordinary and exceptional evidence by reminding us that the marks which turn out to be statistically unusual may have been made for reasons that were entirely conventional, and vice versa.

The outlook which I am considering would have some interesting ramifications. Once annotations are perceived as the durable products of historical actions, they start to look more like other forms of historical evidence, and begin to lose some of their irregularity and mystique. It has been a common enough approach to treat readers’ annotations as evidence about an activity called reading, to acknowledge that they’re not ideal, but then to soldier on anyway. The pragmatism in this is admirable—but it risks artificially limiting the value of the evidence. An alternative would be to approach annotations as the relatives (however far removed) of other types of historical evidence—such as letters, diaries, wills and memoranda—and then to recognise their considerable relevance for finding out about how books were read. If we can manoeuvre annotations out from underneath the shadow of reading per se then we might decide that they have a history of their own which is worth the telling. This has perhaps already started to happen; Bill Sherman’s work on manicules and Ann Blair’s work on note-taking display an interest in the methods and technologies of annotation which others might profitably emulate. Work of this kind, would, in my opinion, leave the subject helpfully poised between social and intellectual history.
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